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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence on growth and income poverty in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC). Results are obtained by processing microdata from 
household surveys of 18 LAC countries covering the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Over this period the LAC economies experienced very heterogeneous patterns of 
growth and poverty changes. Most countries in the region had a rather meager 
performance in terms of poverty reduction. Episodes of positive, significant and 
unambiguously pro-poor income growth have been rare in Latin America. 
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1. Introduction  
The empirical literature on growth and poverty has flourished since the late 1990s. Based 
on household survey microdata, several contributions have tried to elucidate whether 
economic growth tends to “lift all boats”, in particular those of the poor.1 The concern for 
pro-poor growth is in part the consequence of evidence showing that in some countries the 
fruits of economic growth were not equally shared by all the population, and, more 
worrisome, evidence that in some growth episodes the well-being of the poor actually 
decreased.  
This paper provides evidence on pro-poor growth for a sample of 18 Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries in the period 1989-2004. Assessing whether growth is 
associated to a sizeable reduction in poverty is a relevant issue everywhere, but it is 
particular so in Latin America, a region with arguably the highest levels of inequality in the 
world, and where the economic reforms that allowed most countries to grow since the early 
1990s are still a hot issue of debate.  
The literature on poverty and pro-poor growth in Latin America is comprised by two types 
of studies. On the one hand, there is a large number of country studies providing evidence 
on poverty and growth patterns for a given economy.2 Although these contributions can be 
combined to get an overall picture for Latin America, the conclusions from this merge may 
be weak, since country studies significantly differ in many dimensions: the welfare 
indicator (income or consumption), the poverty line, the time period, and the statistics 
shown. They surely also differ in the hundreds of small decisions needed to get from the 
raw data to a poverty estimate (zero incomes, outliers, missing data, weights, and so on).  
                                                 
1 Adelman and Morris (1973) and Ahluwalia (1976) are early contributions to this literature. The recent 
contributions include Ravallion and Chen (1997), Baulch and McCullock (2000), Dollar and Kraay (2000), 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Morley (2001), Foster and Székely (2001), Ravallion and Chen (2003), Kakwani 
and Son (2004), López and Servén (2004), Ravallion (2004) and Son (2004), among others. Several recent 
World Bank Poverty Assessments include discussions and evidence on pro-poor growth at the country level.  
2 The relevant country-specific papers are too many to fit in the typical space of a footnote. See World Bank 
(2005 a) for a sample.  
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The second strand of the literature tries to alleviate these problems by processing household 
surveys from many countries with a consistent methodology. The main international 
organizations in the region (Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), United Nations 
(through CEPAL), and the World Bank) have produced poverty and inequality studies 
including several countries.3 This paper differs from that literature in two dimensions. On 
the one hand, we use a larger and more updated dataset than previous studies, and provide a 
more detailed explanation of the methodology to make the statistics comparable. More 
importantly, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper in which a large consistent 
dataset of Latin American household surveys is used to compute and analyze a broad set of 
pro-poor growth measures. While previous studies are restricted to the traditional poverty 
and inequality estimates, this paper adds several indicators of pro-poor growth. By 
computing pro-poor growth rates, poverty equivalent growth rates, poverty-growth 
elasticities, growth-incidence curves and isopoverty curves with alternative poverty lines 
for all Latin American countries based on a large set of household surveys processed with a 
consistent well-documented methodology, we are able to provide a more rigorous and 
comprehensive picture of poverty and pro-poor growth in the region than the previous 
literature.  
The results of the paper suggest a strong correlation between economic growth and income 
poverty reduction at the country level. On average, poverty has just slightly fallen in Latin 
America and the Caribbean since the early 1990s due to slow income growth (when income 
is measured with household survey data) and increases in inequality. The evidence shown 
in the paper suggests a remarkable heterogeneity of growth and poverty reduction patterns 
across LAC countries. However, almost none of these economies experienced sustainable 
strong growth along with significant equalizing distributional changes in the period 1989-
2004. By means of microsimulations we illustrate the efforts in terms of neutral growth and 
simple redistributive policies needed by each LAC country to attain certain poverty-
reduction targets. These efforts, sizeable in most countries, depend on the shape and central 
position of the income distribution. 
                                                 
3 See Altimir (1994, 1996), Attanasio and Székely (2001), Behrman et al. (2002), CEPAL (2005), Fields 
(1989), Foster and Székely (2001), IADB (1998), Londoño and Székely (2000), Morley (2001), Székely 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly introduce the dataset 
and the main methodological issues involved in measuring growth and income poverty. 
Section 3 starts with a basic question: have Latin American and the Caribbean countries 
grown in the last 15 years? In section 4 we study the distribution of growth rates across 
income strata by examining growth-incidence curves. Section 5 restricts the analysis to the 
lower tail of the income distribution. We compute measures of income poverty, and analyze 
whether growth has been associated to a reduction in the proportion of poor people in the 
population. Section 6 focuses not on the number of poor people, but on their incomes: has 
growth been associated to an increase in the incomes of the poor? We also study whether 
income growth has been higher or lower in poor strata compared to the rest of the 
population. The links between poverty, growth and inequality in the recent experiences of 
LAC economies are examined in section 7 by means of microsimulations. We also compute 
different configurations of neutral growth rates and redistributive policies needed to 
achieve certain poverty reduction targets. Section 8 closes with some concluding remarks.  
2. The data  
Most of the statistics in this paper are obtained by processing microdata from household 
surveys, and are part of the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SEDLAC), jointly developed by CEDLAS at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata 
(Argentina) and the World Bank’s LAC poverty group (LCSPP). The SEDLAC contains 
information on more than 150 household surveys in 21 LAC countries. In this paper we 
restrict the sample to 57 household surveys carried out in 18 LAC countries during the 
1990s and early 2000s (see Table A at the end of the paper). The sample includes data for 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. The sample covers all countries in mainland Latin America (except for 
Guatemala), and two of the largest countries in the Caribbean (Dominican Republic and 
Jamaica). For most countries our sample has three observations corresponding to the early 
                                                                                                                                                    
(2001), Tabatabai (1996), Wodon et al. (2001) and World Bank (1990, 2004). 
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and mid 1990s, and the early 2000s. In each period the sample represents around 92% of 
LAC total population (98% in Latin America and 29% in the Caribbean). Most household 
surveys included in the sample are nationally representative. The two exceptions are 
Argentina and Uruguay, where surveys cover only urban population, which nonetheless 
represents more than 85% of the total population in both countries.4  
Most Latin American countries have experienced significant improvements in their 
household surveys in the last decades. In particular, major changes have been implemented 
in several LAC countries since mid 1990s after the implementation of the MECOVI 
Program. Although these changes are welcome, they pose significant comparison problems. 
An example of this situation is the increase in the geographical coverage of the survey. 
Since regions differ in their economic and social situations, adding a new region into the 
survey usually significantly affects the national statistics. In countries where changes in 
geographical coverage of the survey occurred we provide ways of assessing the impact of 
those changes. For instance, in Bolivia the household survey was urban in 1993 and 
nationally representative in 1997. We present two sets of statistics for Bolivia 1997: one for 
the whole sample and one only for those urban areas also surveyed in 1993.  
Household surveys are not uniform across LAC countries. The issue of comparability is of 
a great concern. We have made an effort to make statistics comparable across countries and 
over time by using similar definitions of variables in each country/year, and by applying 
consistent methods of processing the data. However, perfect comparability is far from being 
assured. A trade-off between accuracy and coverage arises. The particular solution adopted 
contains an unavoidable degree of arbitrariness. We tried to be ambitious enough to include 
all countries in the analysis, and accurate enough so not to push the comparisons too much. 
In any case, we provide the reader with relevant information to assess the trade-offs 
throughout this paper, and in the guide of the dataset in the SEDLAC webpage.5 That guide 
                                                 
4 Some studies suggest that including rural areas would not substantially affect poverty estimates in these two 
Southern Cone countries (Haimovich and Winkler, 2005; Winkler, 2005). Some LAC countries introduced 
national household surveys in the mid 1990s. For time comparison purposes in some cases we restrict the 
analysis to urban areas (e.g. Colombia), despite the availability of recent national surveys. 
5  www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/sedlac/guide.htm  (Gasparini, 2007).  
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is a companion document to this paper, and should be helpful to those interested in 
technical details.  
We perform the poverty and pro-poor growth analysis using four alternative poverty lines: 
the international lines of USD 1 and USD 2 a day at PPP, and the moderate and extreme 
poverty lines used by national governments in each country. For the latter we replicate, 
whenever possible, the income/consumption variable used by the National Statistical 
Offices (NSO) to compute official poverty estimates in each country.6 In most cases it is an 
income variable, although in some cases (e.g. Mexico and Peru) it implies computing a 
consumption aggregate. These national “income” variables widely vary across countries, as 
they differ in the treatment of adult equivalent scales, regional prices, implicit rent from 
own housing, zero incomes, adjustments for non-response and misreporting, and other 
issues.  
In contrast, to apply the international lines of USD 1 and USD 2 we construct a 
homogeneous household per capita income variable across countries/years that includes all 
the typical sources of current income. In the web site of the SEDLAC we include tables 
with all the items considered (or excluded) to compute a comparable income variable in 
each country/year.7  
It is well known that household consumption is a better proxy for well-being than 
household income.8 Despite this dominance, nearly all comparative distributional and 
poverty studies in LAC use income as the well-being indicator. A simple reason justifies 
this practice: few countries in the region routinely conduct national household surveys with 
consumption/expenditures-based questionnaires, while all of them include questions on 
individual and household income. Some authors and agencies adjust average income to 
accord with consumption data from National Accounts to estimate poverty (CEPAL, 2003; 
Wodon et al., 2000; WDI, 2002). However, it is not clear that the adjustment for 
                                                 
6 In those countries where there is not a national agency estimating poverty we either follow a World Bank 
Poverty Assessment or some well-know country study. In Brazil, for instance, we follow the methodology 
proposed by Barros, Carvalho and Franco (2004). 
7 See www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/sedlac 
8 See for instance Deaton and Zaidi (2002).  
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consumption increases comparability, since the reliability of National Accounts need not be 
greater than the reliability of household surveys. Deaton (2003) strongly argues for the use 
of only survey data to compute poverty, as adjustments to match National Accounts “tend 
to overstate the reduction of poverty over time, and to exaggerate poverty differences 
across countries”. In this paper we do not perform any adjustment to compute poverty from 
household surveys. WDI (2003) reports that poverty measures based on consumption and 
those based on income without adjustment do not significantly differ, due to two effects 
that roughly cancel each other out: mean income is higher than mean consumption, but 
income inequality is higher than consumption inequality. Since 2003 the WDI reports 
poverty statistics computed without adjusting income to match consumption from National 
Accounts.  
Most household surveys report incomes obtained during the month previous to the survey. 
Some surveys also include information on incomes earned in the last six months (e.g. 
ENIGH in Mexico). In those cases, and for comparative purposes, we only include incomes 
earned in the last month. Incomes are transformed into monthly incomes if values are not 
reported on a monthly basis (e.g. weekly payments).  
We apply consistent rules to deal with missing incomes. Suppose income from source s is 
missing for individual i. Should we record as missing that individual’s total income? If we 
take that alternative, should we in turn record as missing the total income of individual i´s 
household? We make the following (necessarily arbitrary) decisions. If s is not the main 
source of income for i, then we compute the individual total income ignoring source s.9 If 
instead s is the main source, we record total income as missing. This alternative has the 
advantage of not dropping from the dataset individuals who do not respond questions on 
income sources of secondary importance. The cost to be paid is the likely income under-
estimation for these individuals. Regarding household income, we record it as missing if 
the household head’s total income is missing. Otherwise, we compute household income 
assigning zero income to non-heads with missing income.  
                                                 
9 Information identifying the main source of income is usually available in LAC surveys.  
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Our household income variable includes an estimate of the implicit rent from own housing. 
Some surveys include reliable self-reports of the implicit rent. In those surveys where this 
information is not available, or is clearly unreliable, we increase household income of 
housing owners by 10%, a value that is consistent with estimates of implicit rents in the 
region. All rural incomes are increased by a factor of 15% to capture differences in rural-
urban prices. That value is an average of a set of detailed studies of regional prices in the 
region (Gasparini, 2007). Although certainly arbitrary, we believe this alternative is better 
than (i) ignoring the problem of regional prices altogether, or (ii) using for each country the 
available price information, despite the enormous differences in methodology, scope, and 
results.  
3. Growth: evidence on the mean 
The region had a positive but modest performance in terms of per capita GDP growth 
between 1990 and 2004. The unweighted average annual growth rate was 1.3% when GDP 
is measured in real local currency units (LCU), and 1.4% when GDP is measured in PPP 
US dollars (adjusted by the implicit price deflator of GDP in the United States). Most 
countries in the region managed to grow. However, per capita GDP growth rates were 
rather modest: only a few countries grew at more than 3% per year. Around half of the 
countries in the region had disappointing rates of less than 1%. Growth was not uniform 
across regions and over time (see Table 1). After a bad performance during the 1980s (“the 
lost decade” in terms of growth), the LAC economies grew on average at around 2% in the 
1990s fueled by favorable external conditions and market-oriented reforms. The region 
suffered a period of slower growth and recessions in the early 2000s, with deep crisis in 
some countries. The mean growth rate was a negligible 0.1% in the period 2000-2004.10  
 
- Place Table 1 here – 
                                                 
10 Since around 2003 most countries have overcome the crisis and started to grow again at relatively high 
rates. 
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Table 2 shows the annual growth rates for the countries included in this study. The 
unweighted average growth rate in the sample is 1.5% when measured in real LCU. 
Unfortunately, our analysis with survey microdata does not cover exactly the period 1990-
2004 in each country. That mismatch is driven mainly by the unavailability of reasonably 
comparable household surveys in both years. Columns (iv) and (v) in Table 2 show the 
annual per capita GDP growth rates for the periods to be analyzed with the available 
household surveys in each country. On average the growth rates are somewhat smaller, 
mainly because for some countries our sample starts in the mid 1990s.  
- Place Table 2 here – 
Column (vi) in Table 2 reports the annual growth rates in our homogeneous household per 
capita income variable computed from household survey microdata.11 Growth in that 
variable does not coincide with per capita GDP growth from National Accounts. Of course, 
they are two different concepts and there are many reasons why they may differ in practice. 
The linear correlation coefficient between growth rates in household surveys and in per 
capita GDP is positive and significant. However, some of the differences seem very large. 
In five countries the sign of the growth rates are different. Since poverty figures are drawn 
from household surveys, recorded poverty trends may be different from what is expected 
from looking at per capita GDP figures. Given that, should we adjust incomes in household 
surveys to match National Accounts? There are good arguments to avoid the adjusting, at 
least until differences in National Accounts and household surveys are well-understood 
(Deaton, 2005). A careful study of the reasons behind the differences would be extremely 
helpful, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. In section 5 we include poverty estimates 
obtained by adjusting mean income by National Accounts to provide a robustness check to 
our calculations.  
                                                 
11 In Chile incomes from household survey are adjusted to match some National Accounts figures. 
Unfortunately, for this study we could not completely undo these adjustments to make Chile comparable to 
the rest of the countries. Pizzolitto (2005) reports that growth and poverty patterns are robust to these 
adjustments. 
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4. Growth: evidence on its distribution 
The growth-incidence curves introduced by Ravallion and Chen (2003) are simple and 
illustrative instruments to analyze growth rates along the income distribution. Specifically, 
they show the proportional income change at each percentile of the income distribution. 
They are frequently used to study the extent to which different segments of the population 
participate in the growth process (or suffer from a recession). The interpretation of such a 
simple instrument, however, should be made with caution. There are multiple factors that 
affect income changes, and all are reflected at the same time in a growth-incidence curve. 
Some of them may have nothing to do with the “growth process”, and some may have 
complex interactions. Suppose half of the population lives in the countryside and is poor, 
while the other half lives in the cities and is not poor. Suppose in a given period the 
government has made investments in schools and infrastructure that allowed productivity to 
increase 50% in rural areas and 20% in urban areas. However, in the same period the 
international price of the main crop collapsed, reducing the price received by local farmers 
by 50%. In that scenario, the growth-incidence curve for the country might show stagnant 
incomes for the poor, and increasing incomes for the non-poor. Growth in this country is 
then typically characterized as “not pro-poor” in any of its definitions, despite the fact the 
increase in productivity driven by the government policies benefited (especially) the poor.  
Figures 1 show the growth-incidence curves for all the countries in our sample. These 
curves are constructed from the household per capita income variable obtained in each 
country using the common methodology.12 These curves are known to be very volatile at 
the extremes, especially in the bottom percentiles. For this reason we have computed 
confidence intervals, and deleted from the figures those points where estimates seem very 
imprecise.13 A disappointing result should be noticed from the outset: almost none of the 
LAC countries experienced sustainable strong growth along with significant equalizing 
distributional changes. In fact, Nicaragua is the only country where the growth-incidence 
                                                 
12 Growth-incidence curves for the income/consumption variables used for the estimation of official poverty 
with national lines are available from the authors upon request.  
13 Confidence intervals for all growth-incidence curves are available from the authors.  
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curve lies above the horizontal axis and is decreasing on income, that is, economic changes 
have benefited all the population, and particularly the poor. 
- Place Figure 1 here – 
 The figures illustrate the heterogeneous growth patterns experienced by the LAC countries 
over the last 15 years. For instance, in the Southern Cone, while Chile has experienced 
sustainable growth along the income distribution, in Argentina income changes have been 
negative and clearly unequalizing. Although to a lesser extent, that was also the pattern for 
Uruguay. In contrast, between 1990 and 2003 incomes in Brazil increased a bit, in 
particular in the first half of the 1990s. The growth-incidence curve of Figure 1 suggests 
mild equalizing income changes in that country.  
5. Growth and poverty I: the proportion of poor people 
As an economy grows incomes go up, and then it is expected that some people are able to 
jump out of poverty. The relationship between economic growth and income poverty is, 
however, a subject of much debate. Is there really a negative correlation between these two 
phenomena? Is the correlation strong? Are there many exceptions to the growth-poverty-
reduction story? We start this section by showing poverty statistics, and then link them to 
growth figures.  
We restrict the analysis to income poverty. Poverty is defined as the inability of achieving a 
certain minimum income level, known as the poverty line. Since there is a fundamental 
arbitrariness in defining poverty, different authors and agencies use different poverty lines. 
In this paper we compute a set of poverty indicators based on international poverty lines 
(USD 1 a day and USD 2 a day at PPP) and national poverty lines (extreme and moderate). 
Both approaches (international and national) are useful. While the measurement of poverty 
with national lines takes into consideration that societies differ in the criteria used to 
identify the poor, the international lines are unavoidable instruments to compare absolute 
poverty levels and trends across countries, and provide regional and world poverty counts.  
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The USD1-a-day line was proposed in Ravallion et al. (1991) and used in World Bank 
(1990). It is a value measured in 1985 international prices and adjusted to local currency 
using purchasing power parities (PPP) to take into account local prices. The USD 1 
standard was chosen as being representative of the national poverty lines found among low-
income countries. The line has been recalculated in 1993 PPP terms at $1.0763 a day (Chen 
and Ravallion, 2001). This value is multiplied by 30.42 to get a monthly poverty line. The 
USD-2-a-day line is also extensively used in comparisons across middle-income countries 
(like most of LAC ones), and periodically presented in the World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Although the USD 1 or 2 lines have been criticized, their simplicity and the lack of 
reasonable and easy-to-implement alternatives have made them the standard for 
international poverty comparisons.14  
Following Deaton (2003) and WDI (2004) we compute the poverty line for 1993 in local 
currency units using the PPP adjustment, and then take that value to the month(s) of a given 
survey using the national consumer price index of the country.  
We also compute moderate and extreme poverty using national lines, whenever possible. 
Most LAC countries have official national extreme poverty lines which are mostly based on 
the cost of a basic food bundle, and moderate poverty lines computed from the extreme 
lines using the Engel/Orshansky ratio of food expenditures. Despite some similarities, 
methodologies for national poverty estimates substantially differ across nations. Some 
countries use expenditures (e.g. Mexico), others use incomes (e.g. Argentina) and others a 
mix of income and expenditures (e.g. Bolivia).  
5.1. Poverty changes  
Has poverty fallen in LAC countries during the last 15 years? The estimates in Table 3 
suggest a remarkable heterogeneity. While some countries achieved significant poverty 
reductions (e.g. Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Jamaica, Nicaragua), some others experienced 
large increases in the incidence of poverty (e.g. Argentina and Venezuela). Figure 2 
                                                 
14 See Srinivasan (2004), Kakwani (2004) and Ravallion (2004) for a discussion on the merits and demerits of 
the USD-1-a-day line.  
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illustrates these disparities by showing the change in the poverty headcount ratio (USD-2-a-
day poverty line) between the early 1990s and the estimated value for 2004.15 The results 
are robust to other poverty indicators.16  
- Place Table 3 here – 
- Place Figure 2 here – 
On average, the Latin American performance in terms of poverty reduction over the last 15 
years has been rather disappointing (see Table 4). The population-weighted mean of the 
poverty headcount ratio has dropped 1.2 points when using the USD-2-a-day line. The fall 
in the unweighted mean has been larger, but still meager: just less than 2 points. Poverty 
moderately fell over the 1990s and increased in the early 2000s.17 As the population has 
been growing, and the incidence of poverty did not significantly decay, the number of poor 
people in the region has increased. The recent recovery of the LAC economies is helping 
reducing poverty in most countries, but even in that scenario the overall assessment of the 
last two decades is not positive. Figure 3 shows a small drop in the LAC mean poverty 
headcount ratio between the early 1990s and 2004, and an increase in the number of poor 
people, using both the USD 1 and 2 lines. 
- Place Table 4 here – 
- Place Figure 3 here – 
There are substantial differences across regions in poverty reduction. The unweighted 
poverty mean clearly went down in Central America. In contrast, the performance in South 
America has been weak, while poverty levels went up in the Andean community. The 
population-weighted results are somewhat different. As poverty decreased in the most-
populated country of the region, Brazil, the poverty weighted-mean in the Mercosur went 
                                                 
15 Year 2004 poverty figures are estimated by combining per capita GDP growth rates with poverty-growth 
elasticities (see below). The same procedure is applied when we do not have estimates (own or from other 
sources) for the early 1990s for a given country. 
16 See the SEDLAC webpage for estimations of  the FGT(1) and FGT(2) for all country/years. 
17 The general picture of poverty trends in Latin America from this paper is similar to that from other sources 
(CEPAL, 2005; WDI, 2003). CEPAL (2005) uses a methodology based on national consumption baskets, 
while WDI (2003) uses international poverty lines. 
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significantly down. In contrast, as poverty in Mexico stayed unchanged, the poverty record 
in Central America appears less impressive when taking weighted means.  
As discussed in section 3 changes in incomes from household surveys do not match figures 
from National Accounts. Although our preferred option is to compute poverty only with 
data from household surveys, in order to check for robustness we also follow the 
methodology in Sala-i-Martin (2006) and anchor the mean of the distribution with the per 
capita GDP of each country. Table 5 reports changes in poverty under the two alternatives. 
The linear correlation between the two columns is positive and significant (0.78). However, 
in some countries the differences are sizeable. For instance, while poverty went up 11.4 
points in Argentina according to household survey data, the increase is 4.4 points when 
adjusting the mean for National Accounts figures. In accordance with the findings of 
Deaton (2003), in most LAC countries poverty falls more (or increases less) when adjusting 
for GDP growth. That may be due to faster growth of some income sources not common 
among the poor (capital, benefits, rents). In that case, adjusting incomes in household 
surveys for GDP growth would overstate the fall in poverty.  
- Place Table 5 here – 
5.2. Growth and poverty    
It is said that growth is a fundamental ingredient in the recipe for poverty reduction. In this 
section we examine whether growth in mean income was in fact associated to a reduction in 
the proportion of people below the poverty line, and how strong this link seems to be in 
Latin America. 
The first panel in Figure 4 suggests a strong relationship between per capita GDP and 
poverty levels. The linear correlation coefficient is high (-0.84): countries that have grown 
in the past are those with the lower proportion of poor people. As expected, poor countries, 
in the sense of low per capita GDP, are also countries with a large proportion of poor 
people. Naturally, the association poverty – mean per capita income from household 
surveys is even stronger (second panel in Figure 4). The linear correlation coefficient is -
0.93.  
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- Place Figure 4 here – 
The strong empirical relationship shown above could be the result of a tight association 
between economic development and poverty reduction that occurred in the past, but that no 
longer exists. In fact, some people argue that the new growth patterns in the globalization 
era are leaving the poor behind, and that aggregate economic growth is no longer closely 
linked to poverty reduction. Figure 5, however, suggests that there has been a significant 
relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction during the last two decades. 
The linear correlation when using per capita GDP growth rates is -0.62 in panel A and -0.68 
in panel B. Notice, however, that those economies that have been stagnant or growing at 
very low rates (in terms of per capita GDP) have experienced poverty increases: the linear 
regression line lies above the origin. On average only economies that have grown at more 
than annual 1% have been able to reduce poverty. The relationship growth-poverty 
reduction is stronger when considering the annual growth rates in incomes from household 
surveys: the correlation coefficient is -0.87 in the two bottom scatterplots of Figure 5. 
- Place Figure 5 here – 
Of course, these simple correlations do not prove any causal relationship. That economic 
growth is empirically associated to a reduction in poverty does not mean that anything that 
makes mean income go up will make poverty go down. It also says nothing about the need 
for policy interventions and the appropriate policy instruments. However, the correlations 
shown suggest the relevant role that growth should have in any poverty-reduction strategy.  
How strong is the link between growth and poverty reduction? Even if the relationship 
between these variables is statistically significant, it could be the case that fast growth is 
associated to a small poverty drop. Table 6 reports the annual proportional change in 
poverty and the income growth rate in each period, and the resulting poverty-growth 
elasticities. Although sometimes illustrative, these elasticities are highly sensitive to the 
specific location of the poverty line in the income distribution, and to the growth rate. In 
one extreme if the growth rate is zero, any change in poverty would imply infinite poverty-
growth elasticity. For this reason in Table 6 we delete the elasticities when the growth rate 
is less than 1%.  
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- Place Table 6 here – 
In most countries episodes of economic growth are associated to growing disposable 
income and falling poverty, implying negative poverty-growth elasticities. The magnitude 
of these elasticities varies as we consider incomes from surveys or GDP from National 
Accounts, and alternative poverty lines. On average, the elasticity is around -1.4 when 
considering international poverty lines and income growth from household surveys, and -
1.7 when using GDP growth from National Accounts. The results obtained from a cross-
country regression are similar (Table 7). The results are just illustrative since we have only 
30 observations. The estimated poverty-growth elasticities are around -1.6. The interactions 
of the growth rate with the distance between the poverty line and the mode of the income 
distribution, and with the change in the Gini coefficient do not appear to be statistically 
significant.  
- Place Table 7 here – 
6. Growth and poverty II: the real and relative incomes of the poor  
Frequently, the discussion about growth and poverty deals not with the change in the 
number of poor people, but with the income changes experienced by the poor. In this 
section we start by examining changes in real incomes of the poor population, and then turn 
to relative incomes.  
6.1. The real incomes of the poor  
According to one well-know definition growth is said to be pro-poor if and only if poor 
people benefit in real terms (Ravallion and Chen, 2003; Ravallion, 2004). The growth-
incidence curves computed in section 4 are useful instruments to assess changes in the real 
incomes of the poor. The fact that the curve is above the zero axis at all points up to the 
headcount ratio H means that real income has increased for all the poor population.18 
Define α to be a weighted sum of the individual income growth rates gi, i.e. α=∑iσigi, 
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where σi are the weights, which are non-increasing in income xi. In a typical poverty 
analysis the weights attached to the non-poor are zero, i.e. σi=0 if xi≥z, where z is the 
poverty line. In this context growth is said to be pro-poor if α>0. In particular, if σi is the 
same for all the poor people an equal to 1/NH, where N stands for total population, then α 
is just the average of the growth rates of the poor. Ravallion and Chen (2003) argue for the 
use of this average as a measure of pro-poor growth. They show that this indicator is equal 
to the change in the Watts poverty index per unit time divided by the headcount index. 
The Ravallion and Chen’s measure of pro-poor growth is computed in Table 8 for all the 
countries in our sample. In most cases we present the results for four alternatives poverty 
lines. In columns (iii) and (iv) we compute the mean growth rate of household per capita 
income for those below the USD1 and USD2 lines, respectively. In columns (v) and (vi) we 
compute the mean growth rate in the income (or consumption) variable used for official 
poverty estimates in each country, for those below the extreme and moderate lines. In all 
cases we compute growth rates for those percentiles below H in the initial period.  
- Place Table 8 here – 
The table reads as follows. Between 1992 and 2004 mean income in the Argentina’s 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares decreased at an annual 2.9%. The fall in per capita 
income for the poor was much harsher: around 7.9% per year for the USD 2 a day 
definition. Real incomes for the most disadvantaged fraction of the Argentine population 
have decreased at a fast rate. 
Pro-poor growth rates have been positive in urban Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Jamaica, Panama, and Nicaragua, and negative in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras and Paraguay also 
experienced negative pro-poor growth rates since mid 1990s.  
                                                                                                                                                    
18 It can be shown that it also means that poverty falls for a broad class of poverty measures (Atkinson, 1987). 
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6.2. The relative incomes of the poor  
It is argued that the concept of pro-poor growth should make reference to situations where 
growth is associated to a proportionally larger income increase for the poor than for the rest 
of the population. According to this view growth is pro-poor if poverty falls more than it 
would have if all incomes had grown at the same rate (Baulch and McCullock, 2000; 
Kakwani and Pernia, 2000; Kakwani and Son, 2004; Son, 2004).  
Perhaps surprisingly, the term progressivity, extensively used in tax and benefit-incidence 
analysis, has been rarely used in this literature. A program is said to be progressive if the 
benefits as a share of income are a decreasing function of income. In the same way, growth 
can be defined as progressive if the change in income as a share of initial income (i.e. the 
growth rate) is a decreasing function of income. Define β as a weighted sum of the 
difference between the individual income growth rate gi and the growth rate of the mean 
gµ., i.e. β=∑iσi(gi-gµ). Growth is said to be progressive if β>0. In the case where σi=0 if 
xi≥z, and σi=1/NH if xi<z, then β is just the difference between the average of the growth 
rates of the poor and the growth rate of the mean. The last panel in Table 8 reports this 
measure of progressive growth for four alternative poverty lines. The experiences have 
been heterogeneous across countries. Only four countries have significant progressive 
growth rates. In the case of Dominican Republic and Paraguay that reflects the fact that the 
poor suffered less (in terms of income changes) than the non-poor in the recent economic 
contractions. In Panama and despite a stagnant mean income, the incomes of the poor have 
increased. Finally, Nicaragua is the only country that exhibits growth rates that are 
significant, positive and progressive.19   
In summary, episodes where income growth was positive, significant and unambiguously 
pro-poor (in absolute and relative terms) have been rare in Latin America in the last 15 
years. In contrast, the region has some cases of significant negative growth that strongly hit 
the poor: Argentina and Venezuela for the last decade, and several countries since the late 
1990s fit into this category.  
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7. Poverty, growth and inequality: assessing the past and looking to the     
    future  
 
Driven by a multiplicity of factors individual real incomes change in a given period. These 
changes usually modify different dimensions of the income distribution, like the mean, the 
degree of dispersion, and the mass below certain cut-off points. In this sense growth, 
(associated to the change in the mean of the income distribution), changes in inequality 
(associated to changes in the income dispersion), and changes in poverty (associated to 
changes in the lower tail of the distribution) are all particular manifestations of the change 
in the whole income distribution. Growth, inequality and poverty are “endogenous 
variables”, and then it is not valid, for instance, to think changes in poverty as caused by 
growth and changes in inequality.  
Being said that, researchers have found useful to decompose the change in the whole 
income distribution into two steps: changes in its central position (growth) and changes in 
its dispersion (inequality). Each of these steps in turn implies changes in the lower tail of 
the distribution (poverty). In that analysis, then, changes in poverty are presented as the 
result of growth and changes in inequality. Growth rates in Latin America were analyzed in 
the previous sections. In this section we first take a look at inequality, and then discuss the 
decomposition of poverty changes into growth and redistribution effects.  
7.1. Inequality changes 
The measurement of inequality faces many conceptual and practical issues that are treated 
in a vast literature.20 In Table 9 we show changes in some of the most widespread 
inequality indicators computed over the distribution of household per capita income. The 
SEDLAC web page presents the levels of these inequality measures, estimates using other 
                                                                                                                                                    
19 However, notice that the assessment is not that good when taking consumption as the welfare indicator, that 
is, the variable that is used in Nicaragua to compute official poverty with national lines.     
20 For practical issues in Latin America see Székely and Hilgert (2000), Gasparini (2004) and World Bank 
(2004 and 2005 b).  
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income variables, and confidence intervals for the Gini coefficients. Although the 
inequality ranking of countries varies as we consider different indices, the linear 
correlations among indices are high. Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Uruguay 
and Venezuela consistently rank as the most equal economies in the region, while Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Paraguay occupy the last positions in the inequality ladder. 
- Place Table 9 here – 
 The assessment of the changes in inequality becomes more dependent on the index used 
(see Table 9).21 The correlations are still positive and significant, but smaller in size than 
the correlations of inequality levels. Argentina and Colombia stand out as the countries that 
experienced the largest increases in inequality, with changes of around 6 Gini points. 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela have also witnessed unequalizing 
distributional changes. Brazil is the only country for which all indices coincide in reporting 
a drop in income inequality. In Mexico all measures but the Atkinson index with 
inequality-aversion parameter 2 suggest a fall in inequality. 
7.2. Exploring the changes in poverty  
As discussed above, changes in poverty can be statistically decomposed into growth and 
redistribution effects. In particular, we simulate the poverty change that would have 
occurred in a given period, had the mean income changed, but the shape of the distribution 
stayed fixed. In this simulation poverty changes as the “result” of changes in mean income, 
while inequality remains unchanged. This is the growth effect on poverty changes. The 
redistribution effect records the change in poverty that would have occurred if the shape of 
the distribution had changed in the way it did, but the mean had remained fixed.22 Table 10 
shows the results of decomposing poverty changes into growth and redistribution effects 
                                                 
21 In contrast, the assessment does not depend on the income variable used. For instance, the correlation 
coefficients of the changes in inequality computed over the distribution of per capita income and over the 
distribution of household income adjusted for adult equivalent scales are around 0.99.  
22 See Mahmoudi (1998). Datt and Ravallion (1992) introduced the poverty-change decompositions using 
parametric representations of the income distribution.  
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for each country in our dataset, using four alternative poverty lines. Negative numbers 
mean that income growth and drops in inequality have contributed to poverty reduction.   
- Place Table 10 here – 
Poverty as measured by the USD2 line increased 11.9 points in Argentina between 1992 
and 2004 (column iv). If all incomes had changed (decreased in the Argentine case) at the 
same rate as the mean did, then the poverty headcount ratio would have increased 4.3 
points (column v). The remaining 7.6 points of poverty increase (column vi) were driven by 
changes in the shape of the income distribution, which in the Argentine case were 
unequalizing. Notice that while the redistribution effect accounts for most of the poverty 
change when using the international and the national extreme lines, the growth effect 
becomes prominent when using the national moderate poverty line. This observation is 
mainly driven by the fact that the national moderate poverty line is close to the mode of the 
income distribution in Argentina.  
Most of the successful stories of poverty reduction (using the USD 2 line) were driven by 
generalized growth: Bolivia (92-03), Chile (90-03), Costa Rica (92-03), El Salvador (91-
03), Jamaica (90-02), and Nicaragua (93-01). Only in Brazil (90-03) and Panama (95-02) 
the redistribution effect was larger than the growth effect. Brazil and El Salvador are the 
only cases for which both the growth and the redistribution effect were significantly 
poverty-reducing for all poverty lines.  
Unequalizing distributional changes are behind the increase in poverty in Argentina (92-
04), Colombia (92-00), and Ecuador (94-98). In contrast, the raise in poverty is mainly or 
totally associated to a generalized income drop in Dominican Republic (00-04), Paraguay 
(97-02), Uruguay (89-03) and Venezuela (89-00). Argentina is the only country for which 
both the growth and the redistribution effect were significantly poverty-increasing for all 
poverty lines considered.  
7.3. Looking to the future: isopoverty curves   
Poverty reduction is one of the main goals of national societies and international 
organizations. The roads leading to that goal are subject of great debate. In this section we 
simplify the issue by thinking poverty reduction as the result of either neutral per capita 
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income growth, or redistributive policies, or a combination of both. Of course, reality is 
much more complex: there might be no policy instrument that increase productivity 
proportionally for all the population, while redistributive policies may take a significant toll 
on efficiency, and hence on incomes. However, it is still illustrative to know what is the 
effort in terms of neutral economic growth and simple non-distortionary redistributive 
policies to attain a certain poverty target. This information is useful at least to have an idea 
of the “distance” of the country from the poverty target in terms of growth and 
redistribution.  
Specifically, in this section we compute isopoverty curves, that is, combinations of neutral 
growth rates and simple redistributive policies that are capable of attaining a given poverty 
objective.23 The starting point in each country is the latest income distribution available. 
We model growth by multiplying household income by a constant, thus assuming neutral 
growth. This exercise tell us at what rate the economy should grow, with unchanged Lorenz 
curve, to meet a given poverty target.  
We also model two alternative distributive policies. In the first one we tax all income at the 
same rate and allocate the revenues in equal amounts per capita.24 It can be shown that the 
fall in the Gini coefficient after this exercise is similar to the tax rate. This simple 
redistributive policy, although not targeted to the poor, is not far from the actual fiscal 
system of several countries in LAC, where taxes are approximately proportional and public 
expenditures per capita do not substantially vary with income.  
The second redistributive policy minimizes the fiscal cost of a given poverty reduction, as 
measured by the headcount ratio, since only the poor who are closer to the poverty line 
receive the transfer (i.e. those that need a smaller transfer to escape out of poverty), and 
they receive only the minimum amount needed to reach the poverty line. In addition, 
uniform taxes are only paid by the non-poor. Although this policy would be probably 
undesirable (as the very poorest do not receive transfers), and difficult to implement (as it is 
perfectly targeted, with transfers depending on income), it is theoretically interesting as a 
                                                 
23 See Gasparini and Cicowiez (2005) for specific details on the computation of these curves.  
24 See Paes de Barros et al. (2003) and Ferreira and Leite (2003). 
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lower bound for the fiscal effort to meet the poverty goal. In both redistributive policies we 
assume no efficiency costs (or gains).     
- Place Table 11 here – 
For each LAC country in our sample we compute isopoverty curves using four alternative 
poverty lines. In each case we estimate three curves, corresponding to the goals of reducing 
poverty 25%, 50% and 75% from current levels in ten years. For instance, based on the 
2003 figures Costa Rica will have to grow at an annual rate of more than 2% for the next 
decade to reduce poverty in 25%, assuming no changes in inequality (column (i) in Table 
11). The corresponding growth rates for the target of reducing poverty in 50% are between 
4.9% and 8.7%, depending on the poverty line chosen (column (ii)). Halving poverty 
through a simple redistributive linear policy demands an incremental tax rate of 5.1% if 
poverty is measured with the USD1 line, a rate of 8.5% if poverty is measured with the 
USD 2 line, and of 17% if moderate poverty wants to be halved (column (v)). Obviously, 
the possibility of combining the two policies reduces the growth and tax rates needed to 
reach a given poverty target (see Figure 6). However, notice that the values involved are 
still significant. If Costa Rica grows at an annual 3% for the next decade with no 
distributional changes, it will still need to implement a redistributive policy with a 3.4% 
incremental tax rate to be able to halve poverty, as measured with the USD 2 line. If Costa 
Rica were able to implement a perfectly targeted system of transfers, the fiscal effort to 
halve poverty would be small (incremental rate of around 0.2%).  
- Place Figure 6 here – 
The impact of a neutral growth rate on the proportional change in poverty depends on the 
shape of the income distribution below the poverty line. If the proportion of people “close” 
to the line is large compared to all the people below the line, then neutral growth will take a 
large proportion of people out of poverty. While 20% of the Uruguayans below the USD 2 
poverty line have incomes that are just less than 10% lower than the line, the corresponding 
proportion in Paraguay is 7%. Figure 7 shows that Uruguay would need to growth at much 
smaller rates than Paraguay to halve poverty in 10 years. The linear correlation (across 
countries) between the fraction of the poor who are close to the line and the size of the 
growth effect in Table 11 is negative and large (-0.85). 
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- Place Figure 7 here – 
The size of the redistribution policy needed to achieve a given poverty-reduction target is 
larger for the poorest countries (in terms of mean income from household surveys at USD 
PPP). Poorer countries have lower mean income - and hence lower revenues from a given 
tax rate -, and higher poverty – and hence need a greater effort to halve poverty. The second 
panel in Figure 7 ranks the countries in our dataset by the incremental tax rate needed to 
halve poverty in 10 years with no growth. The linear correlation coefficient between this 
rate and mean income at USD PPP is negative and large (-0.90). Figure 8 illustrates the 
incremental tax rate needed to halve poverty if the economies managed to grow at a neutral 
annual 3% rate for 10 years. For many countries the size of the redistribution involved is 
large.  
- Place Figure 8 here – 
8. Concluding remarks  
In this paper we have provided evidence on the association between growth and poverty 
reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean over the period 1989-2004. We believe that 
the paper makes a contribution to the understanding of poverty and pro-poor growth in 
LAC by (i) applying an homogeneous and well-documented methodology to process 
microdata from household surveys of 18 countries, (ii) computing a large set of 
methodological instruments to study poverty and growth (pro-poor growth rates, poverty- 
equivalent growth rates, poverty-growth elasticities, growth-incidence curves and 
isopoverty curves), and (iii) assessing the robustness of the results to alternative poverty 
indicators and poverty lines.  
We highlight some few general results in this final section. The evidence in LAC suggests a 
strong correlation between economic growth and income poverty reduction. On average, 
economies that have grown (per capita GDP) at more than annual 1% have been able to 
reduce poverty. The relationship growth-poverty reduction is stronger when considering the 
growth rates in incomes from household surveys.  
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On average, poverty has just slightly fallen in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 
early 1990s. This frustrating pattern is associated to slow growth (especially when 
measured with household survey data) and increases in inequality. Almost none of the LAC 
countries experienced sustainable strong growth along with significant equalizing 
distributional changes in the last decade and a half. Most of the episodes of poverty 
reduction in the region were driven by generalized income growth, and not by 
redistribution.  
By means of microsimulations we illustrate the efforts in terms of neutral growth and 
simple redistributive policies needed by each LAC country to attain certain poverty-
reduction targets. We show that these efforts are sizeable, and depend on the shape of the 
income distribution below the poverty line, and on mean income. 
Throughout the analysis we find that the LAC average is not a good representation of the 
country performances. The evidence suggests a remarkable heterogeneity of growth and 
poverty reduction patterns. Poverty has been consistently reduced in urban Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Panama, and Nicaragua. In contrast, the region 
exhibits some cases of significant negative growth that strongly hit the poor: Argentina, and 
Venezuela over the whole period under analysis, and several countries since the late 1990s 
fit into this category. This heterogeneity of experiences is a good scenario for researchers to 
identify the determinants of successful poverty reduction episodes, and in particular the role 
played by economic growth.  
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Table A  
Household surveys in LAC 
Main characteristics 
Country Name Acronym Year Field work Coverage Households Individuals
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1992 October Urban 17,981        67,775        
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1998 October Urban 26,810        99,174        
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 2002 October Urban 21,148        77,733        
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua EPH-C 2004 First half Urban 26,147        93,214        
Bolivia Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1993 November Urban 4,297          20,160        
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo ENE 1997 November National 8,462          36,752        
Encuesta Continua de Hogares- MECOVI ECH 2002 Nov/Dic National 5,746          24,933        
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 1990 September National 78,512        305,967       
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 1995 September National 92,198        334,263       
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 1999 September National 102,005      352,393       
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 2003 September National 117,008      384,825       
Chile Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 1990 November National 25,793        105,189       
Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 1996 November National 33,636        134,262       
Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 2003 November National 68,153        257,077       
Colombia Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo ENH-FT 1992 September Urban 15,626        69,683        
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo ENH-FT 2000 September National * 17,339        72,240        
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2000 III quarter National * 27,135        113,231       
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2004 III quarter National * 11,373        45,841        
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1992 July National 8,479          37,251        
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1997 July National 9,923          41,277        
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2001 July National 10,332        41,841        
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2003 July National 11,150        43,645        
Dominican R. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 1997 April National 3,757          15,754        
Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2000 October National 5,696          22,465        
Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2003 October National 7,904          29,771        
Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2004 October National 7,698          29,289        
Ecuador Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida ECV 1994 Jun/Oct National 4,391 20,731        
Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida ECV 1998 Feb/May National 5,801 26,129        
Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo ENEMDU 2003 December National 18,959 82,317        
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1991 Oct 91-Apr 92 National 18,955        90,624        
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2003 Jan-Dec National 16,808        71,683        
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EPHPM 1997 September National 6,355 32,526
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EPHPM 2003 September National 8,053 40,984
Jamaica Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions JSLC 1990 November National 1,758 6,836
Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions JSLC 1999 June National 1,773 6,140
Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions JSLC 2002 June National 5,092 17,535
México Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 1992 Sept/ Oct National 10,530        50,862        
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 1996 Sept/ Oct National 14,042        64,916        
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 2000 Sept/ Oct National 10,108        42,535        
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 2002 Sept/ Oct National 17,167        72,602        
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida EMNV 1993 Feb/Jun National 4,454          25,162        
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida EMNV 1998 Apr/Aug National 4,040          22,423        
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida EMNV 2001 Apr/Jul National 4,191          22,810        
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 1995 August National 9,875          40,320        
Encuesta de Hogares EH 2002 August National 13,308        54,500        
Paraguay Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1997 Aug 97-Jul 98 National 4,353          20,664        
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 2002 Nov/Dec National 3,789          17,600        
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 1997 IV quarter National 6,487          31,280        
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 2002 IV quarter National 18,598        83,807        
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1989 Second half Urban 9,482          31,766        
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1998 Year Urban 17,656        56,854        
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2001 Year Urban 18,473        57,394        
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2003 Year Urban 18,338        55,369        
Venezuela  Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1989 Second half National 43,543        225,286       
 Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1995 Second half National 18,702        92,450        
 Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 2000 Second half National 16,809        80,417        
 Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 2003 Second half National 46,287        204,647        
Source: SEDLAC (2006).  
* Although the Colombia’s survey is national, in this study we work only with the urban observations.  
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Table 1  
Annual growth rates, 1990-2004 
Per capita GDP  
Constant LCU
90-93 93-97 97-00 00-04 90-04
South America 2.8 2.7 -1.1 -0.8 0.9
Central America 1.9 1.6 2.4 0.0 1.4
The Caribbean 1.1 1.9 2.8 0.8 1.6
LAC 1.8 2.1 1.5 0.1 1.3
PPP
90-93 93-97 97-00 00-04 90-04
South America 2.7 2.7 -1.1 0.2 1.1
Central America 1.2 1.5 2.4 0.4 1.3
The Caribbean 1.1 1.9 2.8 1.0 1.7
LAC 1.6 2.1 1.5 0.7 1.4  
Source: WDI and IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
Table 2  
Annual growth rates 
Per capita GDP and per capita income from household surveys  
    Growth rate p/c GDP Period in     Growth rate p/c GDP Growth rate
                1990-2004 survey        period column (iii) p/c income
Real LCU PPP dataset Real LCU PPP survey
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Argentina 1.8 1.7 1992-2004 0.6 0.5 -2.9
Bolivia 1.2 1.2 1993-2002 1.0 1.0 3.0
Brazil 1.4 1.3 1990-2003 1.2 1.1 0.5
Chile 4.1 4.1 1990-2003 4.1 4.1 3.3
Colombia 0.9 0.8 1992-2004 0.8 0.8 1.2
Costa Rica 2.2 2.1 1992-2003 2.2 2.2 3.9
Dominican Republic 3.2 3.1 2000-2004 0.6 0.2 -9.5
Ecuador 2.8 0.7 1994-1998 0.5 0.5 2.0
El Salvador 1.9 1.0 1991-2003 1.4 1.4 1.8
Honduras 0.5 0.4 1997-2003 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6
Jamaica 0.0 -0.1 1990-2002 -0.2 -0.3 4.7
Mexico 1.3 1.3 1992-2002 1.1 1.1 -0.9
Nicaragua 0.5 0.5 1993-2001 2.3 2.3 3.4
Panama 3.1 3.1 1995-2002 2.9 2.9 0.4
Paraguay -0.8 -0.8 1997-2002 -2.4 -2.4 -8.8
Peru 2.2 2.0 1997-2002 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Uruguay 1.4 1.3 1989-2003 0.6 0.6 -1.4
Venezuela -0.4 -0.7 1989-2003 -1.2 -1.2 -3.7
Average 1.5 1.3 0.9 0.8 -0.2  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys and WDI and  
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
Table 3 
Poverty headcount ratios, levels and change 
USD-2-a-day and national moderate poverty lines 
                USD 2 a day poverty line           National moderate poverty lines
Period Year t1 Year t2 Change Year t1 Year t2 Change
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Argentina 1992-2004 4.2 15.6 11.4 19.7 44.3 24.6
Bolivia -urban 1993-2002 33.6 24.6 -9.0 60.4 50.6 -9.7
Bolivia -national 1997-2002 36.2 43.1 6.9
Brazil 1990-2003 28.8 20.2 -8.6 40.1 33.0 -7.1
Chile 1990-2003 14.4 5.1 -9.3 38.6 19.0 -19.6
Colombia (*) 1992-2000 9.1 16.7 7.6 53.8 59.8 6.0
Colombia (*) 2000-2004 17.5 21.7 4.2 59.8 56.8 -3.0
Costa Rica 1992-2003 12.8 8.8 -4.1 33.2 21.4 -11.8
Dominican R. 2000-2004 8.8 16.4 7.6 20.6 34.6 14.0
Ecuador 1994-1998 36.2 39.2 3.0 19.0 29.5 10.5
El Salvador 1991-2003 49.7 39.1 -10.6 65.7 42.9 -22.8
Honduras 1997-2003 32.6 36.2 3.6 72.3 71.4 -0.9
Jamaica 1990-2002 59.0 44.1 -14.8 29.2 23.3 -5.9
Mexico 1992-2002 26.8 28.0 1.1 52.6 51.7 -0.9
Nicaragua 1993-2001 61.6 48.4 -13.3 50.5 45.8 -4.7
Panama 1995-2002 20.5 17.7 -2.9 37.8 36.7 -1.1
Paraguay 1997-2002 29.4 39.3 9.9 34.8 46.4 11.5
Peru 1997-2002 32.2 32.0 -0.1 42.6 54.2 11.6
Uruguay 1989-2003 3.2 5.0 1.8 28.3 31.4 3.0
Venezuela 1989-2000 18.5 30.8 12.3 36.1 47.3 11.2  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
Note: Year t1 refers to the first year in column (i) Year t2 refers to the last year in column (i)  
(*) In Colombia estimates in column (ii) to (iv) are only for urban areas, while estimates in columns (v) to (vii) are national.  
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Table 4 
Poverty in Latin America 
Headcount ratio and number of poor people 
USD-2-a-day poverty line 
Early 1990s Early 2000s Last survey Change
(i) (ii) (iii) (iii) -(i)
A. Mercosur
   Poverty (weighted) (%) 23.6 19.0 18.8 -4.9
   Poverty (unweighted) (%) 18.1 16.2 17.1 -1.1
   Population (million) 204.4 244.4 246.4 42.1
   Number of poor (million) 48.3 46.5 46.2 -2.1
B. Andean community
   Poverty (weighted) (%) 24.8 34.9 31.4 6.6
   Poverty (unweighted) (%) 30.6 37.2 34.0 3.4
   Population (million) 94.4 118.3 118.0 23.6
   Number of poor (million) 23.4 41.3 37.1 13.7
C. Central America
   Poverty (weighted) (%) 30.5 29.2 29.2 -1.3
   Poverty (unweighted) (%) 36.5 30.0 30.1 -6.4
   Population (million) 112.7 140.4 139.6 26.8
   Number of poor (million) 34.4 41.0 40.8 6.4
Latin America (A+B+C)
   Poverty (weighted) (%) 25.8 25.6 24.6 -1.2
   Poverty (unweighted) (%) 29.3 28.1 27.4 -1.9
   Population (million) 411.5 503.1 504.0 92.6
   Number of poor (million) 106.1 128.8 124.1 18.0  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay 
Andean region: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela 
Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama 
 
 
Table 5  
Change in the poverty headcount ratio 
USD-2-a-day poverty line 
Alternative calculations using (i) data only from household surveys,   
and  (ii) survey data adjusted with per capita GDP growth from National Accounts  
Only household Adjusted with 
survey data p/c GDP growth
(i) (ii)
Argentina 1992-2004 11.4 4.4
Bolivia -urban 1993-2002 -9.0 -1.7
Bolivia -national 1997-2002 6.9 0.9
Brazil 1990-2003 -8.6 -10.9
Chile 1990-2003 -9.3 -10.2
Colombia 1992-2000 7.6 7.5
Colombia 2000-2004 4.2 5.8
Costa Rica 1992-2003 -4.1 -1.4
Dominican R. 2000-2004 7.6 -1.8
Ecuador 1994-1998 3.0 6.0
El Salvador 1991-2003 -10.6 -12.5
Honduras 1997-2003 3.6 2.3
Mexico 1992-2002 1.1 -4.8
Nicaragua 1993-2001 -13.3 -9.5
Panama 1995-2002 -2.9 -6.6
Paraguay 1997-2002 9.9 -0.6
Peru 1997-2002 -0.1 -0.2
Uruguay 1989-2003 1.8 -0.8
Venezuela 1989-2000 12.3 1.6  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys, WDI and  
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
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Table 6  
Poverty-growth elasticities  
   USD 1    USD 2 Extreme Moderate p/c income national p/c GDP income GDP income GDP income GDP income GDP
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv)
Argentina 1992-2004 12.2 11.5 13.2 7.0 -2.9 -3.1 0.6 -4.3 -4.0 -4.3 -2.3
Bolivia (urb.) 1993-2002 -4.1 -3.4 -2.8 -1.9 3.0 2.4 1.0 -1.4 -4.0 -1.1 -3.3 -1.2 -2.8 -0.8 -1.9
Brazil 1990-2003 -2.8 -2.7 -2.1 -1.5 0.5 0.7 1.2 -2.3 -2.2 -1.8 -1.2
Chile 1990-2003 -6.4 -7.6 -7.3 -5.3 3.3 3.3 4.1 -1.9 -1.6 -2.3 -1.9 -2.2 -1.8 -1.6 -1.3
Costa Rica 1992-2003 -2.6 -3.4 -4.2 -3.9 3.9 4.1 2.2 -0.7 -1.2 -0.9 -1.5 -1.0 -1.8 -1.0 -1.7
Dominican R. 2000-2004 14.6 16.9 14.0 13.9 -9.5 -9.9 0.6 -1.5 -1.8 -1.4 -1.4
Ecuador 1994-1998 4.3 2.0 13.8 11.6 2.0 2.0 0.5 2.2 1.0 6.9 5.8
El Salvador 1991-2003 -2.3 -2.0 -4.8 -3.5 1.8 1.1 1.4 -1.3 -1.6 -1.1 -1.4 -4.6 -3.4 -3.3 -2.5
Honduras 1997-2003 2.9 1.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -2.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Jamaica 1990-2002 -1.8 -2.4 -1.9 4.7 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5
Mexico 1992-2002 1.9 0.4 -1.0 -0.9 . 1.1 -2.0 1.6 -0.4 0.4 1.1 -0.9
Nicaragua 1993-2001 -7.4 -3.0 -2.6 -1.2 3.4 -1.6 2.3 -2.2 -3.2 -0.9 -1.3 1.6 -1.1 0.7 -0.5
Panama 1995-2002 -8.5 -2.1 -2.6 -0.4 0.4 0.4 2.9 -2.9 -0.7 -0.9 -0.2
Paraguay 1997-2002 4.4 6.0 0.9 5.9 -8.8 -9.1 -2.4 -0.5 -1.8 -0.7 -2.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -2.4
Peru 1997-2002 -1.6 -0.1 5.7 4.9 -0.1 -2.2 -0.1 -2.6 -2.3
Uruguay 1989-2003 4.6 3.3 -0.2 0.7 -1.4 -1.9 0.6 -3.2 -2.3 0.1 -0.4
Venezuela 1989-2000 5.2 4.7 3.5 2.5 -2.5 -2.4 0.2 -2.1 -1.9 -1.4 -1.0
Annual change in poverty (%) Poverty-growth elasticity
International lines National lines Income growth rate USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
Note: “national” income (column vi) means the income or consumption variable used to compute official  poverty with national lines in 
each country.  
 
Table 7 
Poverty-growth elasticity 
Estimates from a pooled regression model  
Dependent variable: annual change in poverty headcount ratio (%) - USD 2 line  
(i) (ii) (iii) (v)
income growth rate -1.506 -1.659 -1.505 -1.657
(0.157) (0.275) (0.161) (0.290)
Interactions with:
  *distance poverty line-mode 0.122 0.119
(0.228) (0.242)
   *change in the Gini coefficient 0.004 0.005
(0.136) (0.147)
N 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.750 0.745 0.741 0.735  
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
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Table 8 
Ravallion and Chen’s pro-poor growth rates and progressive growth rates  
 
                Ravallion and Chen pro-poor growth rates                         Progressive growth rates
         Income growth rate                                International lines              National lines                                 International lines              National lines
p/c income national USD1 USD2 Extreme Moderate USD1 USD2 Extreme Moderate
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
Argentina 1992-1998 0.2 0.1 -8.1 -8.1 -5.0 -8.4 -8.2 -5.1
1998-2002 -11.9 -11.9 -13.8 -16.0 -15.9 -16.1 -2.0 -4.1 -4.0 -4.2
2002-2004 11.6 10.6 14.4 17.7 16.6 15.3 2.8 6.1 6.0 4.7
1992-2004 -2.9 -3.1 -7.9 -8.1 -6.3 -5.1 -5.0 -3.2
Bolivia (urban) 1993-1997 8.2 8.3 13.0 9.9 10.0 9.1 4.8 1.7 1.7 0.8
1997-2002 -0.9 -2.1 -4.2 -3.3 -4.6 -3.8 -3.3 -2.4 -2.4 -1.7
1993-2002 3.0 2.4 3.3 2.6 1.8 1.8 0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Bolivia (national) 1997-2002 -3.1 -12.8 -8.6 -9.6 -5.5
Brazil 1990-1995 2.2 2.5 1.5 2.7 3.5 3.8 -0.7 0.5 1.0 1.3
1995-2003 -0.6 -0.4 -1.9 -0.4 0.4 0.4 -1.3 0.2 0.7 0.8
1990-2003 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.9 1.6 1.7 -0.4 0.5 0.9 1.0
Chile 1990-1996 5.8 5.7 8.5 6.4 6.4 5.9 2.7 0.6 0.7 0.2
1996-2003 1.2 1.3 0.6 1.3 0.4 1.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.8 -0.1
1990-2003 3.3 3.3 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.3 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.0
Colombia (urb.) 1992-2000 0.5 -9.8 -10.3
2000-2004 2.7 1.4 -1.3
1992-2004 1.1 -5.4 -6.5
Costa Rica 1992-1997 4.5 4.4 13.4 8.3 8.6 5.6 8.8 3.8 4.2 1.2
1997-2003 3.4 3.8 -2.8 -1.3 -1.4 0.1 -6.2 -4.7 -5.2 -3.7
1992-2003 3.9 4.1 4.5 3.1 3.2 2.7 0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.4
Dominican R. 2000-2004 -9.5 -9.9 -3.9 -5.0 -4.3 -6.7 5.6 4.6 5.6 3.2
Ecuador 1994-1998 2.0 -5.6 -2.0 -7.5 -3.9
El Salvador 1991-2003 1.8 1.1 1.9 2.1 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.3 -0.6 -0.4
Honduras 1997-2003 -0.6 -2.2 0.3 -0.9 -1.8 -1.7 0.9 -0.3 0.4 0.5
Jamaica 1990-1999 7.9 1.8 9.4 9.1 2.1 1.5 1.2 0.3
1990-2002 4.7 0.6 2.6 3.2 0.4 -2.2 -1.6 -0.2
Mexico 1992-1996 -7.1 -13.1 -9.1 -6.0 -2.0
1996-2002 3.4 0.5 3.2 -2.8 -0.2
1992-2002 -0.9 -6.1 -2.1 -5.1 -1.2
Nicaragua 1993-1998 4.0 -0.5 10.2 8.1 3.0 2.2 6.3 4.1 3.5 2.7
1998-2001 2.5 -3.5 6.2 3.7 -2.0 -2.0 3.6 1.1 1.5 1.5
1993-2001 3.4 -1.6 8.3 6.4 1.1 0.6 4.9 3.0 2.7 2.3
Panama 1995-2002 0.4 7.0 6.6
Peru 1997-2002 -0.1 -2.2 2.4 1.3 -0.8 -1.9 2.5 1.4 1.3 0.3
Paraguay 1997-2002 -8.8 -3.9 -5.1 5.0 3.7
Uruguay 1989-1998 1.7 1.1 -2.0 -2.0 -0.8 -3.7 -3.1 -1.9
1998-2003 -6.8 -7.0 2.9 -0.4 0.4 -3.9 9.8 6.5 7.4 3.1
1989-2003 -1.4 -1.9 -1.5 -1.6 -2.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.5
Venezuela 1989-1995 -2.9 -2.6 3.9 -1.1 0.4 -1.8 6.8 1.9 3.0 0.8
1995-2003 -4.4 -4.2 -6.2 -3.8 -4.7 -3.5 -1.9 0.6 -0.5 0.7
1989-2000 -2.5 -2.4 -1.1 -2.5 -2.1 -2.6 1.4 0.1 0.3 -0.2  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
Notes: “National” income (column ii) means the income or consumption variable used to compute official  poverty with national lines in 
each country. 
Ravallion and Chen’s pro-poor growth rate = mean of income growth rates for the poor  
Progressive growth rates = difference between the mean of the growth rates for the poor and the growth rate of the mean.  
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Table 9 
Changes in inequality measures 
Distribution of household per capita income  
   Share of deciles       Income ratios                                                           Inequality indices
1 10 10/1 90/10 Gini Theil CV A(.5) A(1) A(2) E(0) E(2)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi)
Argentina 1992-1998 -0.5 3.6 11.2 3.3 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.24
1998-2002 -0.2 2.5 9.4 3.2 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07
2002-2004 0.1 -1.9 -6.0 -2.0 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.06
1992-2004 -0.6 4.2 14.3 4.4 0.06 0.12 0.30 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.37
Bolivia (urban) 1993-1997 0.0 -0.9 0.0 0.2 0.00 -0.07 -0.93 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -1.92
1997-2002 -0.2 3.2 8.1 1.4 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.00
1993-2002 -0.3 2.4 8.2 1.6 0.02 -0.02 -0.93 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.05 -1.92
Bolivia (national) 1997-2002 -0.2 1.9 83.7 11.2 0.02 0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.13 -0.18
Brazil 1990-1995 0.1 -0.6 -4.5 -1.4 -0.01 -0.03 -0.22 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.42
1995-2003 0.0 -1.6 -3.2 -1.5 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.12
1990-2003 0.1 -2.1 -7.7 -2.8 -0.03 -0.08 -0.29 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.54
Chile 1990-1996 0.0 -0.7 -1.5 0.2 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.23
1996-2003 0.0 0.5 -0.5 -1.1 0.00 0.04 0.47 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.94
1990-2003 0.1 -0.2 -2.0 -0.8 -0.01 0.01 0.34 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.71
Colombia (urban) 1992-2000 -0.8 5.5 28.3 5.1 0.07 0.17 0.34 0.06 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.51
2000-2004 -0.2 -1.2 6.8 2.1 0.00 -0.05 -0.27 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.53
Costa Rica 1992-1997 0.1 0.2 -1.0 0.3 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03
1997-2003 -0.3 3.5 8.3 1.6 0.04 0.09 0.21 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.25
1992-2003 -0.2 3.7 7.3 1.9 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.22
Dominican R. 2000-2004 0.2 0.3 -4.8 -0.9 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.26
Ecuador 1994-1998 -0.2 1.6 15.6 1.7 0.02 0.07 0.28 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.52
El Salvador 1991-2003 -0.2 -2.6 5.0 1.3 -0.02 -0.06 -0.23 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.36
Honduras 1997-2003 0.1 0.9 -0.8 1.0 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.16
Jamaica 1990-1999 0.1 -2.7 -19.9 -3.5 -0.02 -0.01 0.36 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.64
1990-2002 -0.2 1.0 74.9 11.7 0.02 0.08 0.38 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.66
Mexico 1992-1996 0.1 -1.7 -6.3 -1.6 -0.02 -0.02 0.54 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 1.35
1996-2002 -0.1 -2.9 -0.1 0.4 -0.03 -0.15 -1.36 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -2.84
1992-2002 0.0 -4.7 -6.4 -1.2 -0.04 -0.17 -0.82 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 -1.48
Nicaragua 1993-1998 0.3 -0.9 -17.8 -4.9 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.14
1998-2001 0.2 1.0 -6.9 -1.9 0.00 0.07 0.58 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 1.23
1993-2001 0.5 0.1 -24.7 -6.8 -0.02 0.04 0.65 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 1.37
Panama 1995-2002 0.2 1.7 -10.4 -0.4 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.17
Paraguay 1997-2002 0.0 1.7 2.0 -1.6 0.01 0.07 0.37 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.67
Peru 1997-2002 0.1 2.0 -3.4 -1.9 0.01 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.41
Uruguay 1989-1998 -0.3 0.4 3.4 1.4 0.02 -0.01 -0.28 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.32
1998-2003 0.3 1.4 -2.1 -0.6 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.09
1989-2003 0.0 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.03 0.01 -0.20 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.03 -0.23
Venezuela 1989-1995 -0.4 3.3 5.1 1.3 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.15
1995-2003 -0.2 -0.9 1.8 0.6 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 -0.05
1989-2000 -0.3 0.9 3.0 0.8 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04
1989-2003 -0.6 2.5 6.9 1.9 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.51 0.07 0.11  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
Income ratios: 10/1=decile 10 /decile 1, 90/10=percentile 90/percentile 10 
CV=coefficient of variation, A(e)=Atkinson's index with parameter e, E(k)=generalized entropy index with parameter k. 
 
 
 36
Table 10 
Decomposition of changes in the poverty headcount ratio 
Growth and redistribution effects   
                                                             USD1                                                             USD2                                                             Extreme                                                             Moderate
Total Growth Redistribution Total Growth Redistribution Total Growth Redistribution Total Growth Redistribution
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
Argentina 1992-1998 1.8 0.0 1.8 4.1 -0.1 4.2 3.8 -0.1 3.9 8.4 -0.5 8.9
1998-2002 6.4 3.2 3.3 15.3 10.9 4.4 19.1 11.3 7.7 27.5 22.6 5.0
2002-2004 -3.8 -2.7 -1.0 -8.6 -5.0 -3.5 -9.9 -5.0 -4.9 -12.6 -8.2 -4.4
1992-2004 4.7 1.0 3.7 11.9 4.3 7.6 13.6 4.0 9.6 25.2 16.0 9.2
Bolivia (urban) 1993-1997 -6.2 -5.1 -1.1 -13.4 -12.6 -0.7 -8.6 -11.0 2.3 -9.1 -14.2 5.1
1997-2002 2.8 1.0 1.8 4.4 1.8 2.6 1.6 4.8 -3.2 -0.7 5.6 -6.3
1993-2002 -3.4 -4.4 1.1 -9.0 -10.7 1.7 -7.0 -7.2 0.2 -9.7 -8.2 -1.6
Bolivia (national) 1997-2002 5.5 3.3 2.2 6.9 5.4 1.5 -1.2 7.2 -8.4 2.7 7.5 -4.7
Brazil 1990-1995 -3.9 -1.9 -1.9 -8.5 -3.7 -4.8 -4.1 -2.9 -1.2 -6.5 -4.5 -2.0
1995-2003 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.9 -1.0 -0.4 0.6 -1.0 -0.6 1.0 -1.6
1990-2003 -3.6 -1.3 -2.3 -8.6 -2.6 -6.0 -4.5 -2.3 -2.2 -7.1 -3.6 -3.5
Chile 1990-1996 -1.8 -1.3 -0.5 -7.6 -7.3 -0.3 -7.4 -6.7 -0.7 -15.7 -14.9 -0.8
1996-2003 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -1.6 -1.4 -0.3 -1.0 -1.3 0.2 -4.3 -3.4 -1.0
1990-2003 -1.9 -1.6 -0.4 -9.3 -8.4 -0.8 -8.4 -7.9 -0.5 -20.0 -18.4 -1.6
Colombia (urban) 1992-2000 5.2 -0.1 5.3 7.6 -0.9 8.5
2000-2004 1.9 3.1 -1.1 4.2 11.2 -7.0
Costa Rica 1992-1997 -2.0 -0.8 -1.2 -4.3 -3.1 -1.2 -4.2 -2.7 -1.4 -9.6 -9.1 -0.5
1997-2003 0.6 -0.6 1.2 0.2 -1.8 2.0 -0.1 -2.3 2.2 -2.3 -7.7 5.3
1992-2003 -1.4 -1.6 0.2 -4.1 -5.3 1.2 -4.2 -5.3 1.1 -11.9 -16.8 4.8
Dominican R. 2000-2004 1.4 3.6 -2.1 7.6 8.5 -0.8 4.8 6.4 -1.5 13.9 15.1 -1.2
Ecuador 1994-1998 2.7 -1.4 4.2 3.0 -3.3 6.3
El Salvador 1991-2003 -5.9 -5.0 -0.9 -10.6 -8.6 -2.0 -15.1 -5.4 -9.7 -23.1 -5.7 -17.4
Honduras 1997-2003 2.3 1.1 1.2 3.6 1.6 2.0 -0.3 2.3 -2.5 -0.9 1.7 -2.6
Jamaica 1990-1999 -21.1 -9.2 -11.9 -25.8 -17.5 -8.3 -13.5 -11.8 -1.6
1990-2002 -7.9 -8.0 0.1 -14.8 -15.3 0.5 -7.4 -6.4 -1.1
Mexico 1992-1996 5.0 4.0 0.9 10.5 9.7 0.8
1996-2002 -2.6 -3.1 0.5 -9.3 -7.3 -2.0
1992-2002 2.4 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.9 -0.7
Nicaragua 1993-1998 -11.6 -5.9 -5.7 -9.4 -6.6 -2.8 -1.3 0.9 -2.1 -2.7 1.2 -3.9
1998-2001 -4.6 -2.1 -2.5 -3.9 -3.3 -0.6 -2.3 4.3 -6.7 -2.0 6.2 -8.3
1993-2001 -16.1 -7.9 -8.2 -13.3 -10.0 -3.3 -3.6 4.7 -8.3 -4.7 6.7 -11.4
Panama 1995-2002 -6.0 0.2 -6.2 -2.9 0.6 -3.4 -3.4 0.2 -3.6 -1.1 0.7 -1.8
Paraguay 1997-2002 4.4 6.2 -1.8 9.9 10.8 -0.9
Peru 1997-2002 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 5.8 4.0 1.8 11.6 6.4 5.2
Uruguay 1989-1998 0.5 -0.1 0.7 0.2 -1.3 1.5 -1.1 -0.8 -0.3 -10.9 -4.5 -6.4
1998-2003 -0.2 0.7 -0.9 1.6 3.8 -2.2 1.0 2.5 -1.5 13.9 12.9 1.0
1989-2003 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.8 1.8 0.0 -0.1 2.8 -2.9 3.0 13.3 -10.3
Venezuela 1989-1995 3.7 1.0 2.7 11.4 3.1 8.3 5.7 1.3 4.3 9.6 3.0 6.6
1995-2003 0.8 3.9 -3.1 0.9 7.5 -6.6 1.3 6.3 -5.0 2.3 9.7 -7.4
1989-2000 4.5 3.1 1.4 12.3 9.6 2.6 7.0 6.3 0.6 11.9 12.3 -0.4
1989-2003 13.2 7.5 5.7 26.0 20.2 5.8 17.9 13.6 4.3 25.2 23.4 1.8  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
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Table 11 
Income neutral growth rate and incremental tax rate needed to achieve a certain poverty-reduction target in 10 years  
       Income neutral growth rate               Redistribution 1                Redistribution 2
Poverty-reduction target 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Argentina (2004)
   USD 1 a day 1.7 4.9 2.0 4.8 11.6 0.0 0.1
   USD 2 a day 2.2 5.0 10.2 5.6 10.5 15.8 0.1 0.4 0.9
   Extreme official 2.1 5.3 9.7 6.0 12.2 17.2 0.1 0.4 1.0
   Moderate official 2.9 6.1 11.6 24.4 36.5 46.2 1.0 3.5 7.5
Bolivia (2002)
   USD 1 a day 4.0 10.4 23.1 8.6 15.4 20.2 0.2 0.9 1.9
   USD 2 a day 3.5 8.6 20.8 19.0 31.4 40.9 0.7 3.0 6.7
   Extreme official 2.0 4.7 8.4 11.6 21.1 28.5 0.4 1.5 3.4
   Moderate official 3.4 7.0 11.7 50.4 63.8 70.6 2.6 9.2 19.0
Brazil (2003)
   USD 1 a day 2.8 8.6 2.8 6.2 10.6 0.0 0.1
   USD 2 a day 2.4 5.4 12.8 5.3 9.9 15.9 0.1 0.4 1.0
   Extreme official 1.9 4.7 10.5 3.4 6.9 11.3 0.1 0.2 0.5
   Moderate official 2.6 5.9 10.9 10.3 18.0 24.6 0.3 1.3 2.9
Chile (2003)
   USD 1 a day 2.4 5.5 11.4 1.7 3.3 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
   USD 2 a day 1.4 3.4 8.1 2.3 4.8 8.7 0.0 0.1 0.1
   Extreme official 1.4 3.5 8.3 2.1 4.6 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
   Moderate official 1.5 3.4 6.8 5.0 9.9 15.6 0.1 0.4 0.9
Colombia (2004)
   USD 1 a day 5.0 5.3 12.5 12.5 0.1
   USD 2 a day 3.1 9.9 8.2 17.0 25.1 0.2 0.8
Costa Rica (2003)
   USD 1 a day 2.8 8.7 2.2 5.1 8.6 0.0 0.0
   USD 2 a day 2.6 6.1 14.2 4.5 8.5 13.3 0.0 0.2 0.4
   Extreme official 2.7 6.4 16.3 4.4 8.4 13.4 0.0 0.1 0.3
   Moderate official 2.1 4.9 10.6 9.2 17.0 25.3 0.2 0.8 1.8
Dominican R. (2004)
   USD 1 a day 1.6 2.9 6.2 2.0 3.5 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
   USD 2 a day 1.5 3.4 6.3 4.4 8.7 13.2 0.1 0.3 0.6
   Extreme official 1.3 3.3 6.3 3.2 7.2 11.4 0.0 0.2 0.4
   Moderate official 2.0 4.8 8.5 11.8 21.6 29.2 0.4 1.5 3.4
Ecuador (2003)
   USD 1 a day 2.1 5.0 12.0 5.3 10.1 16.5 0.1 0.3 0.7
   USD 2 a day 2.3 5.4 10.5 14.5 25.2 34.3 0.5 1.9 4.2
El Salvador (2003)
   USD 1 a day 2.8 7.1 20.8 7.5 14.2 22.1 0.1 0.6 1.3
   USD 2 a day 2.7 6.4 13.9 19.0 31.8 42.2 0.6 2.5 5.8
   Extreme official 2.1 4.9 10.7 7.4 13.9 21.3 0.1 0.5 1.2
   Moderate official 2.5 5.8 11.0 24.5 38.6 48.7 0.8 3.2 7.2
Honduras (2003)
   USD 1 a day 1.6 3.4 6.8 3.8 7.0 11.2 0.1 0.2 0.5
   USD 2 a day 2.3 5.6 9.8 12.8 22.9 30.1 0.4 1.7 3.8
   Extreme official 2.9 6.7 12.0 23.4 36.9 45.3 1.1 4.0 8.7
   Moderate official 4.8 9.4 15.7 90.3 93.6 95.0 5.0 17.1 34.0
Jamaica (2002)
   USD 1 a day 8.4 39.5 12.0 19.2 19.8 0.5 1.8
   USD 2 a day 7.3 21.4 24.8 35.9 39.5 1.2 4.4
   Moderate official 1.4 3.4 6.1 10.4 19.7 27.8 0.2 0.8 1.9
Mexico (2002)
   USD 1 a day 4.5 17.5 7.0 14.6 17.6 0.1 0.4
   USD 2 a day 2.6 7.2 25.9 10.9 21.4 32.8 0.3 1.2 3.0
Nicaragua (2001)
   USD 1 a day 1.6 4.0 8.7 5.2 10.7 17.4 0.1 0.4 1.0
   USD 2 a day 2.5 5.5 9.8 20.9 33.2 42.0 0.9 3.3 7.3
   Extreme official 1.3 3.1 5.3 6.1 12.2 17.7 0.1 0.3 0.8
   Moderate official 2.2 4.6 8.1 27.8 41.5 51.4 0.1 0.3 0.8
Panama (2002)
   USD 1 a day 1.8 4.2 9.2 1.7 3.4 5.9 0.0 0.1 0.1
   USD 2 a day 2.2 5.3 10.1 4.4 8.8 12.9 0.1 0.3 0.8
   Extreme official 2.2 5.4 10.1 4.3 8.5 12.4 0.1 0.3 0.7
   Moderate official 2.9 6.9 12.6 13.7 23.4 30.5 0.5 1.9 4.2
Paraguay (2002)
   USD 1 a day 4.3 12.9 7.8 14.7 19.8 0.2 0.8
   USD 2 a day 3.7 9.5 27.2 16.8 28.0 37.3 0.7 2.5 5.6
Peru (2002)
   USD 1 a day 1.8 4.1 7.6 3.6 7.0 10.6 0.0 0.2 0.4
   USD 2 a day 2.4 5.5 10.2 11.1 19.6 26.9 0.3 1.3 3.0
   Extreme official 1.6 3.5 6.4 9.1 16.6 24.0 0.2 0.8 1.7
   Moderate official 2.4 4.9 8.2 42.7 57.4 66.1 1.6 5.8 12.4
Uruguay (2003)
   USD 1 a day 1.2 2.7 6.5 1.3 2.6 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   USD 2 a day 1.2 2.6 5.4 2.7 5.5 9.5 0.0 0.1 0.1
   Extreme official 1.1 2.1 4.7 2.3 3.9 7.4 0.0 0.0 0.1
   Moderate official 1.8 4.0 6.9 14.3 24.8 33.2 0.4 1.4 3.2
Venezuela (2000)
   USD 1 a day 1.8 5.2 13.5 4.9 11.1 18.3 0.1 0.2 0.6
   USD 2 a day 2.1 4.8 9.2 14.4 25.3 34.8 0.4 1.5 3.4
   Extreme official 1.9 4.4 9.6 7.8 14.8 23.1 0.1 0.5 1.3
   Moderate official 2.6 5.5 10.3 31.2 45.3 55.4 1.0 4.0 8.8  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
Note: Redistribution 1=tax rate t on all the population, and equal expenditures per capita. 
          Redistribution 2=tax rate t on all the non-poor, and minimum expenditures needed to reduce poverty  
                                       headcount ratio. 
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Figure 1  
Growth-incidence curves 
Household per capita income 
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 Figure 2  
Change in the poverty headcount ratio 
between early 1990s and estimated value for 2004 
USD 2-a-day poverty line 
 
Change in poverty (points) Change in poverty (%)
Note: poverty change in Argentina truncated in 1.5, real value is 2.702.
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata of household surveys. 
Figure 3 
Poverty headcount ratio and 
number of poor people 
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata of household surveys. 
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Figure 4 
Scatterplot  
Poverty headcount ratio (USD-2-a-day poverty line) - per capita GDP or income (in PPP USD) 
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata of household surveys. 
Note: values refer to the last available survey in our dataset (early 2000s).    
 
Figure 5 
Scatterplot  
Change in the poverty headcount ratio (USD-2-a-day poverty line) 
and annual growth rates  
 
1. per capita GDP annual growth rate (from National Accounts) 
A. Change in poverty (points) B. Change in poverty (%)
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2. per capita income annual growth rate (from household surveys) 
A. Change in poverty (points) B. Change in poverty (%)
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata of household surveys. 
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Figure 6  
Isopoverty curves 
Combinations of neutral growth rates and incremental tax rate needed to achieve a certain poverty-reduction target in 10 years  
USD-2-a-day poverty line 
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata of household surveys. 
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Figure 7 
Neutral growth rate and incremental tax rate needed to achieve poverty reduction of 50% in 10 years (intercepts of isopoverty 
curves) 
USD-2-a-day poverty line 
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata of household surveys. 
Figure 8 
Incremental tax rate needed to achieve poverty reduction of 50%  
with annual 3% neutral growth for 10 years   
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata of household surveys. 
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